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LOYAL PUBLICATION SOCIETY. 



JVo. II. 



ITO FAILURE FOR THE NORTH 



"We have reached a point in the history of our national 
troubles where it seems desirable to examine our present posi- 
tion, and to consider whether we ought to surrender ourselves 
to despair, or congratulate ourselves on decided success — 
whether we should abandon all attempts to restore the Union, 
assert the dignity of the Constitution, and punish treason, or 
nerve ourselves to new effort, and determine to persevere in a 
righteous cause so long as a single able-bodied man remains, or 
a dollar of available property is unexpended. 

It may be, it must be, conceded that we commenced the con- 
test with very crude and inadequate notions of what war really 
is. We proposed to decide the issue by appealing to the census 
and the tax-list — tribunals naturally enough occurring to a 
mercantile and manufacturing community — but how if the 
enemy prefer cannon and cold steel ? Our first campaign was 
in the field of statistics, and we found the results highly satis- 
factory. Our great numerical superiority, aided by our im- 
mense material resources, gave us an early and an easy victory. 
We outnumbered the enemy everywhere, defeated them in 
every pitched battle, starved them by a vigilant blockade, se- 
cured meanwhile the sympathy and support of the whole civilized 
world by the holiness of our cause, and commanded its respect 
by the display of our material power and our military capacity 
— and in a few short months crushed the rebellion, restored the 
Union, vindicated the Constitution, hung the arch-traitors, and 
saw peace in all our borders. This was our campaign — on 



'"3 



paper. But war is something more than a sum in arithemetic. 
A campaign cannot be decided by the rule of three. No finite 
power can control every contingency, and have all the chances 
in its favor. 

War means alternate success and defeat, alternate hope and 
disappointment, great suftering in the field, many vacant chairs 
at many firesides, immense expenditures with little apparent 
result, " the best-laid schemes" foiled by a thousand unexpected 
contingencies, lamentable indecision in the cabinet, glaring 
blunders in the field, stagnation of industry, and heavy taxation. 

" War is a game, which, -were the natious wise. 
Kings would not play at." 

But nations are not always wise, and war often becomes a 
necessity. When, then, the necessity arises, it should be met 
manfully. The question once deliberately decided that peace 
is no longer consistent with national honor or national safety, 
the dread alternative must be accepted with all its hazards and 
all its horrors. To organize only in anticipation of certain and 
speedy success, to despise and underrate the enemy, to inquire 
with how small an army and how limited an expenditure the 
war can be carried on, is as unstatesraanlike as it is in flat de- 
fiance of all historical teaching. But if we carry our folly still 
farther in the same direction ; if we fail to take into grave ac- 
count the most obvious and inevitable incidents of actual war- 
fare ; if in our overweening confidence we neglect discipline, 
underrate the prime importance of promptness and decision in 
action, certainty and celerity in movement, and energy and ac- 
tivity in pursuit; if, in a word, we expect that the defences of 
the enemy are to fall into our hands by means as unwarlike as 
those that decided the fate of Jericho, or dream that because 
our cause is just every precedent in history, and every principle 
in human nature will be overruled in our favor — then we de- 
serve to be outgeneralled, 'and are fortunate, if we escape 
final and disastrous defeat. 

Now, has not this been precisely our cardinal and capital 
error, and are we not to-day sufi'ering its natural consequences? 
To the blind and unreasoning confidence with which we began 
this war has succeeded a reaction running into the very opposite 

•or 



3 

< extreme. We arc given over to a despondency quite as nn- 
."^ warrantable as the extravagance of our early hopes. We de- 
s raanded and expected impossibilities. Forgetting that the age 
of miracles has passed, many are now bitterly complaining that 
-nothing has been accomplished, and predicting that all future 
^ efforts will terminate in similar failure. Two years have not 
elapsed since the first gun was fired at Fort Sumter ; and yet 
we are amazed and mortified that our forces have not overrun 
the whole South, that victory has not crowned our arms in 
every battle, and that our flag does not float triumphant over 
every acre of every State once called Confederate. Whether 
this most desirable result could have been accomplished, if this 
or tiiat policy had been adopted at the outset, is one of those 
problems that will never be solved ; nor is the inquiry at pres- 
ent pertinent or profitable. Let us rather ask whether, in view 
of the means actually employed, our discontent with the exist- 
ing condition of aff'airs is not unmanly and unreasonable. 
We are to measure results, not by the efforts that we ought 
to have put forth, nor by those which we should put forth, 
if, with our dear-bought experience, we were called upon 
once more to undertake such a gigantic enterprise. We 
must recall the aspect of affairs when we first embarked on this 
perilous sea. We must remember how ignorant we were of all 
the danger before us, how imperfect was the chart by which 
our course was to be determined, how many shoals and sunken 
rocks and cross-currents we were to encounter, as yet unknown 
to any pilot on board our noble ship of state, how little we knew 
of navigation in such angry waters, under so stormy a sky. 

Turn back the pages of history for two short years, and dwell 
a moment on the picture presented to our eyes. A nation, en- 
joying to the utmost the substantial benefits belonging to fifty 
years of profound peace and unexampled prosperity, enervated 
by those habits of luxury which wealth easily accumulated 
always fosters, with a standing army hardly large enough to 
protect our Western frontier from the incursions of hostile In- 
dians, and a navy ludicrously small in proportion to the extent 
of our sea-coast and the value of our commerce, is suddenly 
plunged into a war covering such an extent of territory, and 
calling for such an array of power by sea and land as to dwarf 
into insignificance all modern wars, hardly excepting the mili- 
tary operations of Napoleon I. 



And it must be remembered that education and liabit had 
trained us to an implicit reliance on the sufficiency of our laws 
and the competency of our Constitution to meet and decide 
every issue that could possibly be presented. We could con- 
ceive of no public wrongs which could not be redressed by an 
appeal to the ballot-box, and of no private injuries for which 
our statutes did not provide a suitable remedy. 

AVe were not only a law-abiding, but a. peace-loving people. 
The report of the revolver was not heard in our streets, nor was 
the glitter of the bowie-knife seen in our bar-room. We dep- 
recated mob-violence, and disliked the summary proceedings 
of Judge L3-nch. We took no pains to conceal our horror of 
unnecessary bloodshed, and shared the views of civilized Chris- 
tendom about duelling. We still clung to our ])lebeian pre- 
judices against lawless violence, and persisted in believing that 
a swaggering bully could not be an ornament to cultivated and 
refined society. In fact, some excellent individuals at the 
North went so far as to seek to disseminate these old-fashioned 
notions among their Southern brethren, and made annual sub- 
scriptions to what was known (alas, that we must use the his- 
toric tense !) as the " Southern Aid Society," having for its 
praiseworthy object the support of ministers who should preach 
the gospel to our ardent and impulsive neighbors. AVhat a sad 
and significant commentary is it upon the ingratitude of de- 
praved human nature, that the condescending clergyman who 
whilom consented to collect the offerings of these discriminating 
philanthropists is now a chaplain in the Confederate arm}-, and 
is invoking the most signal judgments of Heaven upon his for- 
mer friends and fellow-laborers ! 

This, then, was our condition, and these were our habits, when 
we were rudely awakened from our dreams of peace by the roar 
of cannon and the clash of arms. What wonder that the startling 
summons found us all unready for such a crisis 1 What wonder 
that our early preparations to confront the issue thus forced upon 
us without note of warning were hasty, incomplete, and quite 
inadequate to the emergency 1 Is it discreditable to us that 
we were slow to appreciate the bitterness and intensity of 
that liatred, which, long smouldering under the surface of 
Southern society, burst forth at once into a wide-spread confla- 



gration, severing like flax all the ties of kindred, and all the 
bonds of individnal friendship and national intercourse which 
had united us for half a century? Here was a section of our 
Union which had always enjoyed equal rights with us under the 
Constitution, and had known the Government only by its bless- 
ings,— nay, more, had actually, by the confession of its own 
statesmen, controlled the internal administration and dictated 
the foreign policy of the country since the adoption of the Con- 
stitution ; which had no substantial grievance to complain of, 
and no fanciful injury which could not be readily redressed by 
legal and constitutional methods. Are we to be blamed because 
we could not easily bring ourselves to believe that an integral 
part of our nation, with such a history, could, under a pretence 
so bald as to insult the common sence of Christendom, rush head- 
long into a war which must close all its avenues of commerce, 
paralyze all its industry, threaten the existence of its cherished 
and peculiar institution, — in a word, whether successful or un- 
successful, inevitably result in its political suicide ? At this 
very moment, accustomed as we have been for many sad and 
weary months to the daily development of Southern folly and 
madness, it is difficult, when we withdraw our minds from the 
present, to realize that the whole war is not a hideous night- 
mare. 

In view of all this, I ask, is it strange that we did not at once 
comprehend all our danger, and did not enter the field with all 
our forces, — determined to fight wath desperate energy until 
every trace of rebellion was crushed out 1 If, disturbed at 
midnight by footsteps in your chamber, you start up from sound 
slumber to see a truculent-looking vagabond prowling about 
your room with a lighted candle, do you not at once spring to 
your feet, collar the intruder, and shout lustily for help, if he 
prove too strong for you 1 Prompt and vigorous action in such 
a case is simply the impulse of instinct. But how if you recog- 
nize in the untimely visitor a member of your own household 1 
Will you seize and overpower him without asking a single ques- 
tion, or waiting for a word of explanation ? Will you not pause 
for some overt act of hostility, some convincing proof of a fell 
purpose? Suppose it transpire that he really mear.s mischief, 
and you lose an important advantage by your delay to strike. 



6 

You may regret the result ; but does it in the least tend to show- 
that you were cowardly or careless? Now, was not this our 
exact dilemma? Although the origin of the war and the cir- 
cumstances attendant upon its commencement are a thrice- 
told tale, are we not in danger of overlooking their bearing 
upon all our subsequent action ? And shall we not act wisely, 
if we recur to them again and again, during this momentous 
contest? 

But, asks a timid Conservative, — from whose patient button the 
fingers of an ardent apostle of peace have recently and most re- 
luctantl}^ parted, — lias not this war been shamefully mismanaged 
by the Administration ? have not contractors grown rich while 
soldiers have sufiered ? have not incompetent generals been 
unjustly advanced, and skillful commanders been summarily 
shelved 1 have we gained any advantages at all commensurate 
with our loss of blood and our expenditure of money ? would 
not a cessation of hostilities on any terms be better than such a 
war as we are now waging? If we might venture to suggest a 
word of caution to our desponding friend, before attempting a 
reply to his broadside of questions, we would say: Beware bow 
you indulge in too much conversation with a certain class of 
our citizens, whose hearty loyalty has been more than doubted, 
and whose conversion to the beauties of peace and the horrors 
of war is so sudden as to be very suspicious. Examine their 
antecedents, and you will find, that, when "border ruffians" in 
Kansas threatened with fire and sw^ord the inoffensive emigrants 
from New England, these gentlemen saw nothing unusual in 
such proceedings, and answered all remonstrances with ridicule. 
Put them to the question to-day, and it will appear, tliat, from 
the very beginning of the struggle, all their sympathies have 
been with the South. They will tell you that Northern Aboli- 
tionists are alone responsible for the war ; that the secession of 
the Southern States may have been unwise, but was not unrea- 
sonable ; that they have always condemned coercion and advo- 
cated compromise; and that there is no safe and satisfactory 
way out of our existing difficulties but — peace. "What do they 
mean by peace? Such peace as the highwayman, armed to the 
teeth, offers to the belated traveller! Such peace as Benedict 
Arnold sought to negotiate with tlie English general ! They 



know that the South will accept no terms but the acknowledg- 
ment of her independence, or the abject and unconditional sub- 
mission of the Free States. They reject the first alternative, 
because they dare not go before the North on such an issue. 
Disguise it as they may, they are willing to adopt the second. 
The party to which, without an exception, these men belong, 
is powerless without the cooperation of the South, and would 
consider no sacrifice of principle too great, and no humiliation 
of the North too degrading, if it promised the restoration of 
their political supremacy. Avoid all such men. Distrust their 
advice. That way dishonor lies, and national disgrace. If you 
are not " armed so strong in honesty" as to be proof against 
such treasonable talk, you will soon be aware of a softening of 
your backbone, and a lamentable loss of earnest, active patriot- 
ism. Take counsel rather of your own common sense. Look- 
ing at the question in its narrowest and most selfish bearings, 
you know that we can neither recede nor stand still. Submis- 
sion is slavery. Disunion paves the way for endless secession, 
and eternal warfare between rising and rival republics. 

But there are other symptoms of disloyalty besides this per- 
sistent demand for peace. There are indications of a desire to 
array sections of the North against each other, and— Heaven 
save the mark ! — by the very politicians who have been most 
bitter in their denunciation of " geographical parties." Here 
comes a little Western lawyer, with unlimited resources of slang 
and slender capital of ideas, barely redeemed from being an abso- 
lute blackguard by the humanizing influences of a New England 
college, but showing fewer and fewer symptoms of civilization 
as he forgets the lessons of his collegiate life ; and he delights 
an audience of New York " roughs" by the novel information, 
that " Puritanism is a reptile" and the cause of all our troubles, 
and that we shall never fulfil our national destiny until Puritan- 
ism has been crushed. Let us not elevate this nauseating non- 
sense into importance by attemping a reply. Such men must 
be left to follow out their inevitable instincts. They are not 
worth the trouble necessary to civilize them. Mr. Karey suc- 
ceeded in taming a zebra from the London Zoological Gardens ; 
but a single lesson could not permanently reclaim the beast, and 
it soon relapsed into its native and normal ferocity. One exper- 



8 



imeut sufficed to show the power of the artist ; no possible in- 
crease of value in the educated animal would have justified a 
prolonged and perfect training. 

You ask if we have gained any advantages commensurate 
with our efforts, or with the high-sounding phrase of our de- 
clared purpose. Let us look at this a moment. Suppose we 
begin with a glance at the other side of the picture. Has all 
the boasting, have all the promises, been on the Federal side ? 
Did we hear nothing of the Confederate flag floating over 
Faneuil Hall? — nothing of AVashington falling into the hands 
of the enemy ? — nothing of a festive winter in Philadelphia 
and a general distribution of spoils in ISTew York? — noth- 
ing of foreign intervention? — nothing of the cowardice of 
Northern Mudsills and the omnipotence of King Cotton ? 
Decidedly, the Rebels began with a sufficiently startling pro- 
gramme. Let us see how far they have carried it out. As 
they were clearly the assailants, we have an undoubted right 
to ask what they have accomplished aggressively. "We say, 
then, that, excepting in the case of one brief raid, the soil of 
a single Free State has never been polluted by the hostile tread 
of an invading force ; that every battle-field has been within 
the limits of States claimed as Confederate ; that wdiile the war 
has desolated whole States represented in the Confederate Con- 
gress, not an acre north of Mason and Dixon's line has sufi'ered 
from the ravages of the Eebel armies. Was ever another 
scorpion more completely surrounded and shut in by a cordon of 
fire? 

This is surely something, but it is by no means all. Have we 
accomplished nothing aggressively 1 We will call into court a 
witnes:5 from the enemy's camp. Hear the recent testimony 
of a leading journal, published in the Confederate capital:* 

" It is not altogether an empty boast on the part of the 
Yankees, that they hold all that they have ever held, and that 
another year or two of such progress as they have already made 
will find them masters of the Southern Confederacy. They 
who think independence is to be achieved by brilliant but 
inconsequential victories would do well to look at the magni- 

* Richmond Examiner, January 20th, 18G3. 



9 

tude of Yankee possessions in our countiy. Maryland, Ken- 
tnckey, and Missouri are claimed as constituent parts of the 
Confederation : they are as much in the power of Lincoln as 
Maine and Minnesota* Tlie pledge once deemed foolish by the 
South, that he would ' hold, occupy, and possess' all tlie forts 
belonging the United States Government, has been redeen)ed 
almost to the letter by Lincoln. Forts Pickens, [Sumter ?] and 
Morgan we still retain ; but with these exceptions, all the strong- 
holds on the seaboard, from Fortress Monroe to the Rio Grrande, 
are in the hands of the enemy. Yery consoling and very easy 
to say that it was impossible to prevent all this, and that the 
occupation of the outer edge of the Eepublic amonnts to 
nothing. Drury's Bluff and Vicksburg give the lie to the first 
assertion ; and the onward movement of Rosecrans towards 
Alabama, the presence of Grant in North Mississippi and of 
Curtis in Middle Arkansas, to say nothing of Banks at New 
Orleans and Baton Rouge, set at rest the silly dream that 
a thin strip of sea-coast only is in possession of our foes. The 
truth is, the Yankees are in great force in the very heart of the 
Confederacy ; they swarm on all our borders ; they threaten 
every important city yet belonging to us ; and nearly two hun- 
dred thousand of them are within two days' march of the Con- 
federate capital. This is no fiction. It is a fact so positive 
that no one can deny it." 

But this reluctant recital by no means exausts the record of 
our success. AVe have put into the field a volunteer force, 
fully armed and equipped, which, whether we consider its 
magnitude, the rapidity with which it has been raised, its 
fighting qualities, its patient endurance of unaccustomed hard- 
ships, or its intelligent appreciation of the principles involved 
in the contest, is without a counterpart in history. And yet 
more, from the invention and achievements of our iron-clads 
dates a new era in naval warfare, while in the value and variety 
of our ordnance we have taken the lead of all civilized nations. 
Can you find in all this nothing to quicken the pulse of your 
patriotism ? Is here no ground for encouragement, no incite- 
ment to renewed efibrt ? 

But you complain of corruption among contractors, and 
of knavery among politicians. Will you point me to a single 



10 

war, ever waged on the face of the earth, where all the rulers 
were above reproach and all their subordinates unselfish ? But 
what will you do about it ? Grant that many contractors have 
made dishonest fortunes out of the calamities of their country, 
and that there are office-holders witli whom " Stand by the Con- 
stitution !" means, Stand by the public crib from which we are 
richly and regularly fed, and ''Uphold the Administration!" 
should be translated. Give us our full four years' enjoyment of 
the loaves and fislies. What then ? Shall a few worthless straws 
here, and a few heaps of offal there, arrest or check the onward 
march of a mighty army, the steady progression of a great princi- 
ple ? Away with such trumpery considerations ! Punish with 
the utmost severity of the law every public plunderer whose 
crimes can be dragged into the light of day ; send to the 
Coventry of universal contempt every lagging and lukewarm 
official ; but, in the name of all that is holy in purpose and 
noble in action, move on ! To hesitate is worse than folly ; to 
delay is more than madness. The salvation of our country 
trembles in the balance. The fate of free institutions for — 
who shall say how long?— may hang upon the issue of the 
struggle. 

Your catalogue of grievances, however, is still incomplete. 
You are dissatisfied with our generalship as displayed in the 
field, and with the wisdom of our policy as developed by the 
cabinet. Unquestionably you have a constitutional right to 
grumble to your heart's content ; but are you not aware that 
such complaints are as old as the history of the human race? 
Do you believe this to be the first war that was ever mis- 
managed, and that our undoubted blunders are either novel or 
peculiar to Republics ? There never was a greater mistake. If 
there were brave men before Agamemnon, and wise counsellors 
before Ulysses, there certainly have been incompetent com- 
manders before Mager-General A., and shallow statesmen 
before Secretary B. "We do not monopolize executive imbe- 
cility, nor are our military blunders without parallel or precedent. 
To attribute our occasional reverses, and our indecisive victories, 
our inaction in the field and our confusion in the cabinet, to our 
peculiar form of government, is as inconsequential as it would 
be to trace all our disasters to the color of President Lincon's 



11 

The enemies of free institutions, hardly yet recovered from 
their astonishment at beholding an army of volunteers, superior 
in number and quality to any the world ever saw, spring into 
existence with such marvellous rapidity, as to eclipse, in sober 
fact, the fabulous birth of Minerva full-armed from the head 
of Jove, or their still greater surprise at seeing the immense 
expenses of so gigantic a war readily met without assistance 
from abroad, by large loans cheerfully made and heavy taxation 
patiently borne, are reduced to the necessity of exulting over 
what they term our " total want of military genius," and our 
" incapacity to conduct a campaign successfully." 

It is useless to deny that we may have challenged criticism 
and provoked a smile by our large promise and our smaller 
performance. But are we the sole and exclusive proprietors of 
this experience ? Where in the past or the present shall we 
find a great and powerful nation much addicted to modesty or 
self-depreciation ? Least of all, should we have expected such 
venomous criticism and such unsparing ridicule from England. 
To be sure, we have long since ceased to look for sympathy or 
even justice at her hands. We have come to understand and 
appreciate the tone and temper of her ruling classes towards 
this country. In addition to their inherited antipathy to Ke- 
publics, they believe in sober earnest what one of their greatest 
wits said jocosely, that " the great object for which the Anglo- 
Saxon race appears to have been created is the making of calico." 
And whatever interferes, or threatens to interfere with this enno- 
bling occupation is sure to incur their passive displeasure, if not 
their active hostility. We expect nothing, therefore, from their 
good-will; but we have a right to demand as a matter of good 
taste, that, in criticizing our campaigns, they shall not wholly 
ignore their own military blunders, especially those so recent 
as to be fresh in the recollection of every third-form school-boy 
in the kingdom. For, if campaigns carried on with the smallest 
possible result in proportion to the magnitude of the sacrifice 
of money and life, — if a succession of incompetent generals in 
command, — if critical military opportunities neglected and 
enormous stragetic blunders committed, — if indecision, nepot- 
ism, and red tape at home, envy, want of unity, and incapacity 
among officers, and unnecessary and inexcusable hardship 



12 

among the privates, — if all this declares the decadence of a 
Government, then was the sun of England hastening to its set- 
ting during the Crimean War. 

AYe hear much said abroad about our indecisive battles, our 
barren victories, our failure to take advantage of the crippled 
condition of a defeated enemy, and our unaccountable disinclina- 
tion to follow up a successful attack by a prompt pursuit. Now, 
not for the sake of excusing or palliating the numerous and 
grave errors into which we have fallen during our own unhappy 
struggle, nor yet to exonerate from censure any civil officers 
or military leaders who may be wholly or in part responsible 
for these errors, but simply to demonstrate that they are liable 
to occur under any form of government, and, indeed, have re- 
cently befallen the very Government whose rulers now hold us 
to the strictest account, and are most eager to convict us of ex- 
traordinary misconduct and incapacity, we propose, very briefly, 
and without farther introduction, to examine the record of the 
English army during the Crimean War. 

The first important battle fought on the Peninsula was that 
of the Alma. We will give, as consisely as possible, so much 
of the history of this engagement, compiled from autlientic 
English sources, as will present a correct picture of the plans 
formed and the results accomplished. 

" The 15th of August, 1854, was the first date fixed for the sail- 
ing of the allied forces from Yarna to the Crimea. It was post- 
poned until the 20th, then till the 22d, then the 2Gth,— then 
successiv-ely to the 1st, 2d, and 7th of September ; that is, the 
French fleet left Yarna on the 5th, and the English sailed from 
the neighboring port of Baltschik on the 7th." It is admitted 
that " these delays hazarded not only the success, but even the 
practicability of the whole design, as between the 15th and 25th 
of September the great equinoctial gales sweep over the Black 
Sea, and lash into tempests of the most destructive nature." 

The voyage, however, was accomplished in safety, and on the 
14th of September tlie Allies arrived at the Crimea, oft' a place 
called the " Old Fort," only about thirty miles north of Sabas- 
topol. The whole army was composed of 27,000 English, 
24,000 French and 8,000 Turks. The landing occupied the 
14th, 15th, and 16th of September. At nine o'clock, A. M., 



13 



of September lOtli, the army began the advance, and on the 
evening of the same day rested for the night within sight of the 
Russian forces, strongly intrenched on tlie banks of tlie Abna, 
about twelve miles distant from the " Old Fort," Early in the 
afternoon of the following day the Allies attacked the strong- 
hold of the enemy, and in less than three hours the Russian in- 
trenchments were successfully stormed, and the Russian army 
was iu full retreat. The English and French troops fought with 
determined and distinguished bravery, and their victory was 
complete. But what was decided by this bloody struggle ? 
Bad generalship on the part of the Russians, certainly ; but 
what else? Mr. Russell says, — "This great battle was not de- 
cisive, so far a8 the fate of Sebastopol was concerned, merely 
because we lacked either the means or the military genius to 
make it so." The victory was not followed up, the retreating 
foe were not pursued, ample time was given to the eneni}' to re- 
organize and retrieve their losses, and the evening of the event- 
ful yOth of September found the allied forces no nearer the cap- 
ture of Sebastopol than they were before the battle. 

Did " the Alma" crown the allied generals with fresh and 
well-earned laurels ? "We appeal once more to Mr. Russell : 
" I may inquire, Was there any generalship shown by any of 
the allied generals at the Alma ? We have Lord Raglan painted 
by one of his staff, trotting in front of his army, amid a shower 
of balls, 'just as if he were riding down Rotten Row,' with a 
kind nod for every one, and leaving his generals to fight it out 
as the best they could ; riding across the stream through the 
French Riflemen, not knowing where he was going to, or where 
the enemy were, till fate led him to a little knoll, from which 
he saw some of the Russian guns on his flank ; whereupon he 
sent an order to Turner's battery for guns, and seemed surprised 
that they could not be dragged across a stream and up a hill 
which presented some difficulties to an unencumbered horse- 
man ; then cantering off to join the Guards just ere they made 
their charge, and finding it all over while he was in a hollow of 
the ground." Lord Raglan, let it be remembered, was the 
Commander-in-Chief of the English forces. And again : "The 
Light Division was strangely handled. Sir George Brown, 
whose sight was so indiftereut that he had to get one of liis offi- 



14 

cers to lead liis horse across the river, seemed not to know where 

his division was If the conduct of a campaign be a snc- 

cession of errors, the Crimean expedition was certainly carried 
on secundum artemP Once more, on the same point, and 
quoting from the same authority : " All the Eussian officers 
with whom I have conversed, all the testimony I have heard 
or read, coincide on these two points : first, that, if, on the 
25th, we had moved to Bakschiserai in pursuit of the Russians, 
we should have found their army in a state of the most com- 
plete demoralization, and might have forced the great majority 
of them to surrender as prisoners of war, in a sort of cul-de-sac^ 
from which but few could have escaped ; secondly, that, had 
we advanced directly against Sabastopol, the town would have 
surrendered, after some slight show of resistance to save the 
honor of the officers." Certainly, such generalship as this did 
not promise very well for the results of the campaign. 

Let us follow the movements of the Allies a little farther. 
On the morning of September 25th, the combined forces took 
up their line of march southward. On the 2Gth, they reached 
and occupied the town of Balaklava, about six miles distant 
from Sebastopol. On tiie 2Sth of the same month. Lord Raglan 
wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of War, " We 
are busily engaged in disembarking our siege-train and pro- 
visions, and we are most desirous of undertaking the attack of 
Sebastopol without the loss of a dayP And yet it is not until 
October 10th, that the Allies commence digging their trenches 
before the town. Meanwhile the allied army was anxious and 
impatient. " ' When will the siege commence V was the con- 
stant inquiry of the wearied and expectant troops. ' To-mor- 
row,' was the usual response, ' most probably to morrow.' But 
day after day came and went, and the Allies still rusted in inac- 
tion, M-hile the Russians worked day and night at strengthening 
their defences." " The time dragged heavily on ; still the Rus- 
sians worked with incredible indu:>try, and still the cannon of 
the Allies had not yet opened their thunders upon Sabastopol." 
On the 17th of October, twenty-one days after the occupation of 
Balaklava, the allied forces commenced fire by land and sea 
on the stronghold of the enemy. The bombardment continued 
from half-past six, A. M., until nightfall, but is conceded to 



15 



have been a complete and mortifying failure. From this time 
until the 5th of November, it will not be contended that any 
substantial advantage was gained by the invading forces, or 
that material progress was made towards the reduction of tlie 
Kussian Gibraltar. 

Then came the battle of Inkerman, a gallant and desperate 
sortie of the Russians, bravely and successfully resisted by the 
besiegers. The loss of life on both sides was terrible. To what 
extent was this battle decisive ? Mr. Russell shall give his own 
testimony on this point : " We had nothing to rejoice over, and 
almost everything to deplore, in the battle of Inkerman. We 
defeated the enemy, indeed, but had not advanced one step 
nearear the citadel of Sebastopol." In other words, the Allies 
had repulsed the Russians, but had barely escaped annihilation, 
while, from having been the besiegers, tliey became the be- 
sieged, and remained so until largely reinforced from home. 
" A heavy responsibility," says Mr. Russell, " rests on tliose 
whose neglect enabled the enemy to attack us where we were 
least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them to despise 
precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many 
valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy." The 
English not onfy committed the serious error of underrating the 
enemy, and neglecting the most ordinary precautions against 
surprise, but, during the whole of the desperate and bloody 
fight, tliey gave no proof whatever of generalship. The stub- 
born, unyielding bravery of the troops was the salvation of 
the army. " We owed the victory, such as it was, to strength, 
not to superior intelligence and foresight. It was a soldiers' 
battle, in which we were saved by the muscle, nerve, and cour- 
age of our men." Humanity shudders and the heart sickens 
over the sufferings of that gallant army of martyrs to Cabinet 
incapacity and military imbecility during the long and dreary 
winter of 1854-55. 

On the 9th of April, 1855, commenced the second grand 
bombardment of Sebastopol, which, though continuing for 
twelve days, resulted, like the first, in mortifying failure, no se- 
rious or irreparable injuries being caused to the main defences 
of the enemy. " The real strength of the place remained un- 
impaired. That which was injured during the day the Russians 



16 



repaired as if by magic during the niglit. The particulars of 
tliis twelve days' bombardment are wearisome. The same 
wasted energy, tlie same night skirmishes without effect, the 
same battering and repairing, the same unwearied exertions on 
the part of the Allies and wonderful endurance and resistance 
on the ])art of the llussians, together with, on each side, the 
same loss of life and frightful mutilations." 

Two months were passed in comparative inaction, the sad 
monotony being varied only by ineffective sorties and indecisive 
skirmishes. On the 18th of June the first grand assault of the 
Malakoff and Eedan was attempted. The allied troops dis- 
played the utmost gallantry, and did all that brave men could 
do under disgracefully incompetent commanders, but were re- 
pulsed with horrible slaughter. No one can read the details of 
the fruitless massacre, without fully confirming the indignant 
testimony of an intelligent eye-witness, writing from the camp : 

*' I know not what may have been the feelings of your home 
public, on reading the telegraphic news of our defeat, (for I 
presume the scribes at headquarters made no attempt to conceal 
the naked truth, that our repulse was neither more nor less than 
a defeat,) but here mingled shame and indignation were general 
throughout the camp. Officers and men alike felt that dis- 
grace had been incurred, and that solely in consequence of the 
unredeemed mismanagement of their generals. Kemembering 
the confusion which characterized the commencement of our 
movement, and coupling this with the murderous preparations 
made by the enemy, you will be at no loss to understand that 
success M'as most improbable. During the whole affair, Lord 
Eaglan and Sir George Brown were ensconced within our eight- 
gun battery ; but, though this afforded a good view of the scene 
of the struggle, and of the disorder which marked it, they ap- 
peared to be unable to give any efficient directions for the cor- 
rection of our multipled blunders. When the whole sad scene 
was ended, our men straggled back to the camp in a state of 
dispirited confusion, well in keeping with the mob-like disorder 
in which they had been throughout the assault." 

The final bombardment of Sebastopol took place on 
the 5th of September, followed on the 8th by the renewed 
assault of the French on the Malakoff and of the Eng- 
lish on the Redan. Skillful generalship, adequate forces, 



17 

and desperate bravery gave victory to the French, and " the 
key to Sebastopol " remained in tlieir hands. Meanwhile the 
English assault upon the Redan was repulsed with frightful sac- 
rifice of life. It will not be contended that the French owed 
any part of their success to superior good fortune. Indeed, all 
the extrinsic advantages were on the side of the English. The 
French were to lead off in the assault, and the tri-color waving 
over the captured fortification was to be the signal for the ad- 
vance of the English. If the French succeeded, every sentiment 
of personal ambition and national pride would stimulate their 
allies to achieve an equal victory. If the French failed, the 
English had only to remain in their trenches. 

Now let us examine the comparative generalship displayed 
in the two assaults. We are quite willing that English author- 
ity should draw the contrast. " The preparations of the French 
-were actually scientific in their vigorous attention to every mat- 
ter calculated to lead to victory ; nothing appeared to have 
been forgotten, nothing neglected. Even the watches of the 
leading officers had been regulated, that there might not be the 
smallest error with regard to time. It is a painful reflection 
that this carefulness of preparation, and prescience with respect 
to probabilities, was not shown by the English general and his 
associates in arranging the mode of attack. "When the orders 
were promulgated, on the Yth, many officers shook their 
heads doubtingly, and observed, in deprecating tones, ' This 
looks like another 18th of June.' It was generally observed 
that the attacking columns were not strong enough, that they 
were too far behind, and that the trenches did not afl:ord room 
for a sufficient number of men." 

The signal for the French assault was given ; thirty thousand 
men, weary of long inactivity, and burning to add new lustre 
to the bright record of their country's military glory — drums 
and trumpets meanwhile sounding the charge, and the air re- 
sounding with shouts of " Vive VEmjjereur " — darted from 
their trenches, swarmed up the embankments, dashed over the 
parapet, swept the enemy like chafi" before them, and the Mal- 
akoff was won. Hours of the fiercest fighting found the French 
still masters of the situation ; at nightfall the Russian general sul- 
lenly drew oflT his defeated forces, and the victory was complete 
3* 



18 

It is painful to turn from this brilliant picture to tlie sombre 
coloring and the dreary details of the attack on the Redan. To 
three thousand doomed men was assigned the perilous under- 
taking. Incredible as it may appear, in view of previous fail- 
ure, there seems to have been no adequate preparation, no in- 
telligible plan, no competent leader. It was simply brute force 
assailing brute force. The few men who actually entered the 
Kedau neglected to spike the guns ; no reinforcements came to 
their aid ; everything was blind excitement, and headlong, un- 
disciplined haste. " The men of the different regiments became 
mingled together in inextricable confusion. The Nineteenth 
men did not care for the officers of the Eighty-eighth, nor did 
the soldiers of the 23d heed the command of an officer who did 
not belong to their regiment. The officers could not find their 
men — the men lost sight of their officers." But why dwell on 
what soon became mere butchery ? The loss of the storming 
party, in killed, wounded, and missing, was 2,i47 ! 

Considered as a military movement, it would seem to be con- 
ceded that no grosser blunder could have been made than the 
selection of so small a force for so desperate an undertaking* 
There was no chance of success but by attacking simultaneously 
both flanks and the salient of the Kedan. The storming party 
was barely large enough for the assault of the salient, thus ex- 
posing the handful of men to a murderous and fatally destruct- 
ive fire from the flanks. This was bad enough, certainly, but 
worse remains behind. English critics have most severely cen- 
sured our generals for sometimes placing new recruits in posts 
of danger, requiring cool heads, steady nerves, and the liabits 
of discipline. Perhaps they have forgotten the following incident. 
Among the picked men selected out of the entire British forces 
as this very storming party were raw recruits from the Ninety- 
seventh regiment, who were designated for this perilous service as 
a punishment for their cowardice in a recent skirmish ! — and to 
make this punishment still more severe, they were ordered to 
lead off in the assault ! An historian of the war says : " THie in- 
experience of some of these recruits seems almost incredible. 
One young fellow, who came to the field-hospital witli a broken 
arm and a bullet in his shoulder, carried his firelock with him, 
but confessed that he had never fired it off, as he loas imable to 



19 

do so. Tlie piece, upon being examined, was found to be in 
perfect order. Such poor, undisciplined lads, fresli from the 
plough, ouglit never on any occasion to have been pitted against 
the well-drilled soldiers of Russia ; but it was something worse 
than blundering to lead them on to the assault of a formidable 
work like the Eedan. Such generalship recalls to our mind the 
remark of the Russian officer with regard to the military force 
of England, that ' it was an army of lions led by donkeys.' " 
Mr. Russell states that many of these recruits " had only been 
enlisted a few days, and had never fired a rifle in their lives." 

Kow, will it be believed that General Codrington, to whom 
was committed the planning and directing of this ill-starred 
and disastrous enterprise, succeeded Sir James Simpson as 
commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's forces in the Crimea? 
How must tlie shade of Admiral Byng have haunted Her 
Majesty's Government, unless it was a most forgiving ghost ! 
If General Codrington's promotion could have been delayed a 
little more than eighteen months, it might have occurred appro- 
priately on the centennial anniversary of the death of that ill- 
fated naval commander, convicted by court-martial and shot for 
" not doing his utmost !" 

On the evening of the 8th of September, the Russians blew 
up their magazines, fired the buildings, and evacuated the town. 
So fell Sebastopol, after a siege of three hundred and forty-five 
days. It has been considered by the English a bit of very 
choice pleasantry to allude to our oft-recurring statement, that 
" the decisive blow had been struck," and that " the backbone 
of the Rebellion was broken." It may not be impertinent to 
remind them, that the report, first circulated in France and 
England in the latter part of September, 1851, and fortified by 
minute details, that Sebastopol — the backbone of Russian re- 
sistance to the allied arms — had fallen, was repeated and reiter- 
ated from time to time during the war, until the phrase, " Sevas- 
topol est 2)ris,^'' passed into a by-word, and did good service in 
relieving the cruelly overworked Greek Kalends. 

And now we come naturally to the consideration of another 
and an important inquiry. Did the beginning of the war find, 
or did its progress develop or create, a single English general 
of commanding military capacity, competent to handle in tlie 



20 

field even so small an army as tlie British contingent in the 
Crimea ? Of Lord Eaglan Mr. Russell says, and without doubt 
says truly : "That he "vvas a great chief, or even a moderately 
able general, I have every reason to doubt, and I look in vain 
for any proof of it, whilst he commanded the English army in 
the Crimea." Another authority says : " The conviction that 
he was not a great general is universal and uncontradicted. 
He could perform the ordinary duties of a general satisfactorily, 
but he was lamentably deficient in those qualities which consti- 
tute military genius. He possessed considerable professional 
experience, great application, and remarkable powers of en- 
durance ; but he lacked the energy, vehemence, and decision of 
character which are essential to the constitution of a successful 
military chieftain." To his hesitation in council, and his want 
of energy and promptness in action, have always been attrib- 
uted, in large measure, the ruinous delays and the fearful suf- 
fering in the army which he commanded. Lord Raglan died 
in June, 1855, in his sixty-seventh year. General Simpson 
succeeded him. "It was believed at the time," writes Mr. 
Russell, " and now is almost notorious, that he opposed his own 
appointment, and bore testimony to his own incapacity." "He 
was slow and cautious in council, and it is no wonder that 
where Lord Raglan failed. General Simpson did not meet with 
success." The English press and people demanded his recall. 
His incompetency was everywhere acknowledged, and indeed 
he himself would have been the last man to deny it. In about 
three months from the date of General Simpson's appointment, 
" the Queen was graciously pleased to permit him to resign the 
command of the army." As we have already seen, his place 
was filled by General Codrington. This officer was as signally 
rewarded, because he had failed, as ho could have been, if he 
had succeeded. Mr. Russell quotes approvingly the comment 
of a French officer upon this appointment : " If General Cod- 
rington had taken the Redan, what more could you have done 
for him than to make him General, and to give him command 
of the army ? But he did not take it, and he is made General 
and Commander-in-Chief." AVith equal discrimination, Sir 
James Simpson was created Field-Marshal ! Tiie remainder of 
the campaign gave General Codrington no further opportunity 



21 

of displaying his qualities for command. No other important 
action occurred before the termination of hostilities. 

Great credit is certainly due to Mr. Russell for fearlessly ex- 
posing the errors and incompetency of the three officers suc- 
cessively at the head of the English army, in spite of " much 
obloquy, vituperation, and injustice," and for bearing his 
invariable and eloquent testimony to the bravery, endurance, 
and patience of the British private soldier. 

In this brief recital of English blunders during the Crimean 
war, we have made no mention of the desperate and disastrous 
" charge of the light brigade," the gross and culpable, inef- 
ficiency of the Baltic fleet under Admiral Sir Charles Napier, 
and other instances of military incapacity no less monstrous. 
Enough, however, has been told to more than justify the very 
mild summing-up of Mr. Russell, that the " war had exposed 
the weakness of our military organization in the grave emer- 
gencies of a winter campaign, and the canker of a long peace 
was unmistakably manifested in our desolated camps and deci- 
mated battalions." 

"Why should we add to this dismal recital the appalling suf- 
ferings of the soldiers — helpless victims to bad management at 
liome and shameful neglect in the field — the long, freezing 
nights of trench-work under a driving rain, " without warm or 
water-proof clothing — the trenches two and three feet deep with 
mud, snow, and half-frozen slush, so that many, when they took 
oflf their shoes, were unable to get tlieir swollen feet into them 
again, and might be seen barefooted about the camp, the snow 
half a foot deep on the ground," creeping for shelter into 
" miserable tents pitched as it were at the bottom of a marsh, 
where twelve or fourteen unhappy creatures lay soaking with- 
out change of clothing," until they were called out again to 
their worse than slave-labor — disease, brought on by exhaustion, 
exposure, overwork, and deficient food, sweeping the men ofi:' 
by thousands, and yet no sufficient supply of medical stores and 
no adequate number of medical attendants, not a soul seeming 
to care for their comfort or even for their lives — so neglected 
and ill-treated that " the wretched beggar who wandered about 
the streets of London led the life of a prince compared with the 
British soldiers who were fighting for their country, and who 



22 



were complacently assured bj the home authorities that they 
•were the best-appointed army in Europe." The world knows 
the whole sad story by heart. And is it not written in the 
volumes of evidence sworn to before tlie Commission appointed 
by Parliament to inquire into the condition of the army ? 

Nor is it necessary to dwell upon the extent to which the 
home administration was responsible for the general misman- 
agement of the war, in its main features, and its minute 
details, nor the tiioroughly English stolidity with which all com- 
plaints were received by every member of the Government, 
from the cabinet minister who dictated pompous and unmeaning 
despatches, down to the meanest official who measured red tape, 
nor the intense and universal popular indignation which, after 
a year " full of horrors," compelled the resignation of the Ab- 
erdeen Ministry. Lord Derby did not, perhaps, overstate the 
verdict of the nation, when he said in the House of Lords : 
" From the very first to the very last, there has been apparent 
in the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government a want of 
previous preparation, a total want of prescience ; and they 
have appeared to live from day to day providing for each suc- 
cessive exigency after it arose, and not hefore it arose. Too 
LATE have been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct 
of Her Majesty's Government in the course of the war," The 
change in the ministry, however, by no means cured all the evils 
which had existed ; for, although the suflerings of the soldiers 
— thanks in large part to the providential appearance and heroic 
conduct of Florence Nightingale — were gieatl}' diminished, still, 
as we have seen, the military blunders continued to the close of 
the war. 

Kow, if we do not greatly mistake, the lesson which this 
country should learn from the mortifying experience of the 
English army in the Crimea is not one of exultation over 
its lamentable and unnecessary errors, but rather of indifference 
to the insulting criticism of a nation which can so ill afford to 
be critical, and of determination to profit in every possible way 
by those blunders which might have been avoided. The his. 
tory of all wars, moreover, should teach us that now and then 
there comes a time when to hold the olive-branch in one hand 
and tlie sword in the other, especially if the olive-branch is kept 



23 



in the foreground and the sword in the background, involves not 
only a sad waste of energy, but is mistaken kindness to our 
enemies. 

Use every weapon which the God of Battles has placed in 
our hands. Put forth all the power of the nation. Encourage 
and promote all fighting generals; cashier all officers who are 
determined to make war on peace principles ; arm, equip, and 
discipline negroes, not to burn, plunder, and massacre, but to 
meet their and our enemies in fair and open fight.* Demon- 
strate to tlie world that we are terribly in earnest. Waste no 
time in discussing the chance of foreign intervention. Postpone 
polygamy in Utah, African colonization, everything, to the 
engrossing and emergent crisis w^hich now confronts the Gov- 
ernment. Make the contest sharp, short, and decisive. Put 
down the Rebellion, vindicate the majesty of the Law, the 
sacred ness of the Union, and the integrity of the Constitution. 
There will be time enough, after this is done, to discuss all 
minor questions and all collateral issues. One paramount duty 
lies directly before us. Let us perform this duty fearlessly, and 
leave the future with God. 



* The opposition to the employment of negro regiments, if made by traitors 
North or South, can be easily comprehended ; if made bj loyal men, is wholly 
inexplicable. Your neighbor's house takes fire at night. The flames, long smoul- 
dering, make rapid progress, and threaten the comfort, certainly, if not the lives of 
the household, and the total destruction of his property. The alarm is given. An 
engine comes promptly to the rescue. It is just in season to save his dwelling. 
The firemen spring with ready alacrity to their places. But stop I He suddenly 
discovers tiie appalling fact that they are negroes ! True, there is not a moment to 
be lost. No other engine is, or can be, within helping distance. The least delay 
means poverty and a houseless family. And yet he rudely dismisses the dusky 
firemen, folds his arras with Spartan stoicism, and, looking complacently on the 
burning building, says ; " Better this than to rely on the assistance of niggers !" 
/s i^ Spartan stocism ? Is it not rather stark lunacy? And would you not take 
immediate measures to provide such a man with permanent quarters in a mad- 
house ? 



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